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The regulation of administrative procedures in the EU is currently a topic under much scruti-
ny. This chapter addresses some of the debates regarding a possible innovative codification of 
EU administrative procedure law. It does so by looking at changing modes of delegation of 
powers for implementation of EU law and policy and the evolving legal context of the EU’s 
highly integrated multi-level system. The chapter therefore addresses questions such as which 
criteria should govern the exercise of powers delegated to the administration. It does so by 
looking at how effective decision-making procedures can be geared towards ensuring that 
basic constitutional principles and values are complied with in real-life administrative action. 
Answers to these questions also guide considerations about which elements should ideally be 
addressed by a possible codification of administrative procedure law of the EU.  
 
A. The Current Situation and the Basis for Reform Debates 
 
The EU, from its very beginnings, has been designed as an experimental undertaking for shar-
ing sovereignty. In the past six decades of integration, it has developed and transformed itself 
many times through inter alia taking-on responsibilities for an increasing amount of policy 
areas and deepening its role in their administration.  
The beginnings of European integration with the creation of the first of the ‘European com-
munities’, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) consisted of an organization deal-
ing with sector-specific regulation giving it a distinctively administrative character.2 But the 
establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) under the Treaty of Rome 
changed the focus of public attention on matters related to integration in some ways away 
from a sector specific-regulation. It was geared towards the creation of a framework Treaty 
applicable to more broadly defined economic regulation for the common market. The EEC 
was therefore basically engaged in what would qualify as acts of general content of a quasi-
                                                 
2 The ECJ case-law relating to the ECSC acknowledged the essentially administrative nature of the ECSC and its 
acts, reviewing them by reference to criteria developed in national administrative law, interpreted mainly in the 
light of the French administrative tradition. These concepts included inter alia the presumption of validity, the 
consequences for illegality, and the conditions for revocation of administrative acts, as well as the distinction 
between the non-existence and the nullity of administrative acts and the conditions for and consequences of the 
revocation of administrative acts, such as liability. See Case 4/54 ISA v High Authority [1954-1956] ECR 91; 
Case 8/55 Federation Charbonniere de Belgique v High Authority [1954-56] ECR 245; Joined Cases 7/56 & 3-
7/57 Algera and Others v Common Assembly [1957] ECR 39; Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority [1957 and 
1958] ECR 133; Case 10/56 Meroni v High Authority [1957 and 1958] ECR 157; Joined Cases 43/59, 45/59, & 
48/59 Von Lachmüller v Commission [1960] ECR 983; Case 105/75 Giuffrida v Council [1976] ECR 1395.  
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legislative nature.3 Member States implemented EEC law within each state using their specific 
national legislative, administrative and judicial apparatus. This is the model of indirect admin-
istration sometimes also described as ‘executive federalism’.4 Despite this, EU law has trans-
formed the constitutional, regulatory and administrative structures of its Member States. It 
does so in very concrete ways, for example, by requiring Member States to establish certain 
regulatory structures such as independent regulatory or supervisory agencies.5 This has been 
often not only the result of specific policy needs but also resulting from more general re-
quirements of ensuring effective and equal application of EU law. Also the setup of the EU’s 
executive itself has been subject to transformation. Through the creation of ever more special-
ised agencies generally coordinating Member State implementation with action of EU bodies 
and in some important areas also having been granted genuine decision-making powers, the 
EU has also significantly increased the diversity and amount of actors involved in implemen-
tation. 
General principles governing the procedures of the ‘European administration’ were initially 
developed by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Other mat-
ters of procedure were addressed in a piece-meal fashion successively by legislative acts of the 
Union. Some of the underlying basic values have since also been outlined in various Treaty 
provisions such as the foundational principles in Articles 2 TEU and Articles 9-12 TEU ad-
dressing questions of democracy, transparency, and participation. An source with growing 
importance in practice if also the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights which includes inter 
alia procedural rights such as those to good administration (Article 41 CFR) and to an effec-
tive judicial remedy (Article 47 CFR). Amongst others, the constitutional principles which 
require compliance across the policy areas with the rule of law and its sub-elements, democra-
cy, transparency, openness, participation and good administration. These principles define 
                                                 
3 H-P Ipsen, ‘Zur Exekutivrechtsetzung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft’, in: P. Lerche, P. Badura, R. Scholz 
(eds), Wege und Verfahren des Verfassungslebens, Beck (München 1993) 425 with further references. 
4  J Frowein, ‘Integration and the Federal Experience in Germany and Switzerland’, in: M. Cappelletti, M. 
Seccombe, J. Weiler (eds), Integration through Law — Europe and the American Federal Experience, Vol 1: 
Methods, Tolls and Institutions, Book 1: A Political, Legal and Economic Overview de Gruyter (Berlin 1986) 
573; K. Lenaerts, ‘Regulating the regulatory process: “delegation of powers” in the European Community’ 18 
ELRev (1994) 23; J. Ziller, ‘L’autorité Administrative dans l’Union européenne’ 14 EUI Working Papers Law 
(2004) 9. 
5 Member States are sometimes obliged under EU law to create independent agencies under national law: See 
e.g. the EMCDDA Regulation 302/93/EEC of 8 February 1993 also establishing the European Information Sys-
tem on Drugs and Drug Addiction (Reitox network) [1993] OJ L 36/1, the EU-OSHA Regulation (EC) No 
2062/94 establishing a European Agency for Safety and Health at Work [1994] OJ L216, the EFSA Regulation 
[2002] OJ L31/1, the EASA Regulation [2008] OJ L79/1, the ECDC Regulation [2004]  OJ L 142, the CFCA 
Regulation [2005] OJ L128/1, and the FRA Regulation [2007] OJ L53/1. See: H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe, A. 
Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the EU, Oxford (OUP 2011). 
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some of the essential normative yardsticks against which the legitimacy and lawfulness of ex-
ecutive rulemaking procedures ought to be assessed.6 One of the central challenges is how to 
improve realisation of constitutional principles of the EU in the de-centralised implementation 
of EU law whilst at the same time simplifying the policy-centred system of laws. 
Ensuring compliance of administrative procedure law with higher ranking constitutional pro-
visions is a formidable challenge in a unitary system, in which legislation, executive rule-
making and final individualised decision-making are undertaken by the same body of law 
within the same legal person. Within the EU, the conditions are more complex since imple-
mentation of EU law and policies is organised both on the EU level as well as within the 
Member States: Despite organisational separation of the various actors on the national or Un-
ion levels, procedural rules link the actors from various levels to a single system of ‘European 
administration’.7 The procedural rules achieving this linkage are policy-specific. With only a 
few exceptions,8 they are not generally harmonised across policy fields. Only very few acts are 
applicable to more than one policy in a horizontal manner. Each policy which EU law touches 
has developed its own approach and set of rules. Generally speaking, the evolutionary devel-
opment of administrative procedure rules in a policy specific manner have led to a patchwork 
of rules and procedures applicable to the exercise of delegated powers. The pluralisation of 
actors contributing to implementation of EU law on the European level and the emergence of 
networks of regulators organised by agencies have complicated the matter further.  
 
I. Delegation and Pluralisation of the Executive   
 
                                                 
6  D. Curtin, H. Hofmann, J. Mendes, ‘Constitutionalising EU Executive Rule-Making Procedures: A Research 
Agenda’ (2013) 19 ELJ 1. 
7 This can be regarded as the actual sense of the use of this term in Article 298(1) TFEU. 
8 An example for this rare kind of horizontally set of rules is the Comitology regulation applicable to the exercise 
of implementing powers conferred on the Commission under Article 291 TFEU and the previous Comitology 
decisions. See: Comitology Decisions of 1987, 1999, and 2006 and the Comitology Regulation of 2011. See: 
Council Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July 1987 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing 
powers conferred on the Commission [1987] OJ L197/33, Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 lay-
ing down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission [1999] OJ 
L184/23 amended by Council Decision 2006/512/EC of 17 July 2006 [2006] OJ 2006 L200/11; Regulation 
(EC) 182/2011 of 16 February 2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the rules and 
general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of im-
plementing powers [2011] OJ L55/13. Another is the financial regulation of the EU governing the expenditure 
of EU budgetary means Regulation 966/2012 of the EP and the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial 
rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 
1605/2002, OJ 2012 L 298/1. 
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Compliance, in principle, with the basic ideas of executive federalism, however, have also had 
profound impact on the administrative organisation within the Union. Delegating executive 
powers to the EU-level to be exercised, as the Treaties had originally envisioned, by the 
Commission was in many cases regarded as a threat to de-central administration by Member 
States. Nonetheless, the considerable increase in EU powers in successive Treaty amendments 
and the complexity of the policy regimes established, make delegation a necessity. This is 
acknowledged in the Treaties in that the Commission can be conferred competences to adopt 
so called ‘delegated’ acts (Article 290 TFEU), which allow for supplementing and amending 
non-essential parts of Union legislation, and ‘implementing’ acts (Article 291 TFEU) confer 
genuine administrative powers on the Commission subject to control of the Member States. 
Only exceptionally under Article 291 TFEU, can implementing powers be conferred on the 
Council.  
Delegation to other bodies than the European Commission, however, is in reality a more gen-
eral phenomenon than might be expected when reading Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. Imple-
mentation of EU policies in which a wide variety of actors, such as the Commission, Europe-
an agencies, networks, and private parties are involved. This has been driven by practical ne-
cessity and political impulses, rather than being designed around any preconceived or abstract 
constitutional model.9 A subsidiarity-friendly approach allowing for continued de-central ad-
ministration in view of needs of coordination of policy approaches in the ‘European adminis-
trative space’ as the area without internal frontiers, was the creation of a large number of EU 
agencies.10  
Agencies provide a unitary administrative framework within which they integrate, usually 
through committees, networks of national and supranational administrative bodies.11 Although 
each individual EU agency has its specific raison d’être, generally speaking, the need for the 
creation of agencies can often be broadly linked to the development of a system of integrated 
administration in Europe. The ‘agencification’ of the EU executive is in part due to the need 
                                                 
9 H.C.H. Hofmann, A.H. Türk, ‘Policy Implementation’ in: H.C.H. Hofmann, A.H. Türk (eds), EU Administra-
tive Governance Cheltenham (Elgar 2006). 
10 See e.g. Case C-66/04 UK v Parliament and Council (Smoke flavorings) [2005] ECR I-10553; Case C-217/04 
UK v Parliament and Council (ENISA) [2006] ECR I-3771; Case C-270/12 United Kingdom v Commission 
(Short selling) [2014]. 
11 The use of the concept of network in this context is not meant as a reference to any of the ‘network’ theories, 
developed in particular in political science, but rather to a relationship between different authorities. For an 
analysis of the network theories in relation to agencies, see E. Chiti, ‘Decentralisation and Integration into the 
Community Administrations: A New Perspective on European Agencies’ 10 ELJ (2004) 402. The fact that the 
creation of agencies was undertaken in a rather unsystematic and even haphazard way, is not specific to the EU 
but a common feature to many legal systems. R. Dehousse, ‘Delegation of Powers in the EU: The Need for a 
Multi-principals Model’ (2008) 31 Western European Politics 789, 790.  
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for the establishment of centres of regulatory competence to inform political decision-making 
and thereby to contribute to the technical quality of regulatory activity.12 ‘Technical’ issues of 
fact-finding and risk assessment are often a task delegated to specific EU agencies designed to 
bring together the relevant actors from the supranational, national, regional and international 
level to ensure a co-ordinated provision of expertise.13 Importantly, most agencies created in 
the past decade have also been given a role in preparing executive rule-making by the Com-
mission.14 Some have also been granted powers to adopt individually legally binding decisions 
(adjudication in US terms). In some cases, such decision-making involves carrying out the 
complex economic assessments required in highly regulated areas, such as for example deci-
sions taken by the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA),15 the Office for the Harmonisation 
of Internal Market (OHIM for the registration of trademarks),16 and the European Securities 
and Market Authority (ESMA).17 These agencies exert administrative discretion qualified by 
the provisions of the relevant regulations. 
 
II. Integrated Administration and Composite Procedures 
 
The pluralisation of executive bodies in the EU both result from and are at the same time a 
result of a change in the functions performed by administrations of the Member States and the 
                                                 
12 See especially Case C-270/12 United Kingdom v Commission (Short selling) [2014] para 82. See also, in its 
2002 Communication, the Commission describes the key reason for the establishment of agencies in the ability 
to provide scientific assessments based on technical evaluations which ‘are not influenced by political or con-
tingent considerations’ (Communication from the Commission – The operating framework for the European 
Regulatory Agencies, COM (2002) 718 final, 5).  
13 In the field of food safety, the EFSA carries out the function of risk assessment while the Commission is at-
tributed the role of managing such risks on the basis of the scientific advice provided by the EFSA.An example 
can be found in the network operating under the supervision of the European Environmental Agency (EEA), 
[2009] OJ L126/13 – codified version. The EEA Regulation has entrusted the agency with establishing the Eu-
ropean Environment Information and Observation Network (EIONET), which consists of the EEA itself, five 
European Topic Centres, National Focal Points and National Reference Centres, creating a network of around 
900 experts from 37 different countries. Other agency regulations contain requirements for the establishment 
and management of similar networks, such as the EMCDDA Regulation (Reitox network), the EU-OSHA Regu-
lation, the EFSA Regulation, the EASA Regulation, the ECDC Regulation, the CFCA Regulation, and the FRA 
Regulation. See: H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe, A.Türk, Adminsitrative  Law and Policy of the EU Oxford 
(OUP 2011) 285-306. 
14 D. Curtin, H. Hofmann, J. Mendes, ‘Constitutionalising EU Executive Rule-Making Procedures: A Research 
Agenda’ 19 European Law Journal (2013) 1. E. Chiti, European Agencies’ Rulemaking: Powers, Procedures 
and Assessment, 19 European Law Journal (2013) 93. 
15  See REACH Regulation 1907/2006 [2006] OJ L396/1. 
16 Case T-187/06 Schräder v Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) [2008] ECR II-3151, confirmed on ap-
peal in Case C-38/09 P Schräder v Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) [2010] ECR I-3209. 
17 Case C-270/12 United Kingdom v Commission (Short selling) [2014]. 
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EU when implementing EU law and policy. The changes are characterised by a re-definition 
of the conditions of public administration in the EU and the development of a genuinely ‘inte-
grated administration’. Administrative functions in the EU are now undertaken in nearly all 
policy areas with input from several administrative actors both from the Member States and 
the European level. They are linked together through procedural provisions under EU law. 
The integrated administration from this point of view has emerged from the fundamental 
needs of the Member States to forge links between, on one hand, national and European ad-
ministrations and, on the other, between and among Member State administrations. The objec-
tive is to maximise the problem-solving capacity, influence and effectiveness of a de-centrally 
organised administrative implementation of EU law and policies.18 As Lindseth observes, in 
the EU as in the Member States, ‘the separation of regulatory power from the ultimate sources 
of legitimacy has been among the most important elements of the constitutional settlement of 
administrative governance in the twentieth century, whether national or supranational.’19 
The increasing integration of administrative procedures in the EU requires any administrative 
procedure law to acknowledge and structure the fact that in many cases, both Member State 
and EU authorities contribute to ‘composite procedures’20 These are multiple-step procedures 
with input from administrative actors from different jurisdictions, cooperating either vertically 
(between EU authorities and those of a Member State), horizontally (between authorities in 
two or more Member States) or in triangular relations (involving authorities of different 
Member States and of the EU).21 Final measures or decisions, whether issued by a Member 
                                                 
18 The success of integration has been ascribed to the fact that purely intergovernmental structures would not 
have been capable of addressing the joint regulatory problems faced by a market as integrated as that of EU. A 
federal structure, on the other hand, could be expected to threaten the very existence of the EU Member States 
by establishing strong hierarchical structures which the Member States may not be prepared to support. Creating 
an integrated administrative structure is the third way characterised by decision-making and implementing strat-
egies on the European level where necessary, but satisfying Member States by maintaining a strong role through 
broad and intensive participation (W. Wessels, ‘Verwaltung im EG-Mehrebenensystem: Auf dem Weg in die 
Megabürokratie?’, in: M. Jachtenfuchs, B. Kohler-Koch (eds), Europäische Integration (Leske + Budrich 
1996); W. Wessels, ‘An Ever Closer Fusion? A Dynamic Macropolitical View on Integration Processes’  35 
JCMS (1997) 267).  
19  P. Lindesth, Power and Legitimacy Oxford (OUP 2010) 19. 
20 See also with further discussion: H.C.H. Hofmann, ‘Decision-Making in EU Administrative Law – The 
Problem of Composite Procedures’  61 Administrative Law Review (2009, special edition) 199. 
21 Composite procedural elements exist for example in the area of technical safety, product safety (See Directive 
2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on general product safety 
[2002] OJ L11/4), standardisation and normatisation (Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical 
standards and regulations [1998] OJ L204/37, as amended), procedures leading to the admission of medical 
products (Regulation 726/04 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down Community proce-
dures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing 
a European Medicines Agency [2004] OJ L136/1, as amended), and genetically modified organisms (Art. 11, 
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State or an EU authority, are based on procedures involving more or less formalised input of 
the participants from the different levels. Within policy areas regulated by EU law, there are 
many examples of procedures with composite elements,22 but forms of cooperation differ from 
one policy area to another. A common feature, is that procedural integration of administra-
tions in the EU often relies upon procedures designed to jointly obtain and assess information 
necessary for a final decision.23 Information cooperation is, therefore, at the heart of rules and 
procedures governing EU administrative law but composite procedures also arise with respect 
to enforcement cooperation.  
The continuing pluralisation of the executive in combination with highly integrated adminis-
trative procedures has created its own problems of transparency and accountability. This arises 
not least from a potential blurring of responsibilities in coordination activities and contribu-
tions to composite procedures which may lead to difficulties in discerning who is responsible 
for which part of a decision and how to influence the process. Accordingly, composite proce-
dures have often escaped judicial review both on the national and the EU level because their 
activities can take place in the realm of preparatory measures and collection as well as distri-
bution of information needed for final decision-making only.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 and 18 of Directive 2001/18/EC of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate release into the environment of genet-
ically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC [2001] OJ L106/1), regulation of tele-
communications (Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services [2002] OJ L108/33), pub-
lic procurement (Directive 2004/18/EC of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of 
public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ L134/114; Directive 
2004/17/EC of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, en-
ergy, transport and postal services sectors [2004] OJ 2004 L134/1; Regulation 1564/2005 of 7 September 2005 
establishing standard forms for the publication of notices in the framework of public procurement procedures 
pursuant to Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [2005] OJ 
L257/1, asylum procedures (Council Regulation 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment 
of «Eurodac» for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention [2000] 
OJ L316/1), as well as the combating of money laundering (Council Decision 2000/542/JHA of 17 October 
2000 concerning arrangements for cooperation between financial intelligence units of the Member States in re-
spect of exchanging information [2000] OJ L271/4).  
22  EU administrative law is understood as the body of law governing administration by EU institutions and 
bodies as well as Member States administrations acting within the sphere of EU law, i.e. when they act either to 
implement EU law or when they are bound in their activity by general principles of EU law. 
23  See with further references and explanations in H.C.H. Hofmann, ‘Composite Procedures in EU 
Administrative Law’ in: H.C.H. Hofmann, A.H. Türk (eds), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law: The 
Move to an Integrated Administration Cheltenham (Elgar, 2009). 
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III. Consequences  
In the EU, powers are jointly exercised under a largely rule-based legal and political system. 
In this, all sorts of government and governance functions are shared in a multi-level structure 
characterised by an organizational separation of administrative actors organised either on the 
level of the EU or by the Member States. 24 This separation has been made workable by very 
significant forms of procedural cooperation and interaction within specific forums organised 
by EU law.25 Trans-jurisdictional cooperation is an essential component of administration in 
the EU. Specific procedural rules enable and shape cooperation. But aside of the ‘comitology’ 
procedures,26 now limited to the area of implementing acts under Article 291 TFEU, most 
procedural rules for implementing EU law through administrative procedures are policy-
specific. Amongst these, agencification stands out as the central paradigm of the change of the 
EU from national actors reaching out to the EU level to a fundamental restructuring of the 
regulatory space with genuine cooperative procedures. On the other hand, the pluralisation of 
the executive bodies and the reliance on networks instead of clear allocation of administrative 
responsibility between Member States and EU bodies has led to a complication of regulatory 
procedures and an increasing challenge to maintain values such as the rule of law and trans-
parency as well as to ensure modes of judicial review and other forms of anticipatory and ex 
post modes of accountability. 
 
                                                 
24 On the structure of the EU administration, see, among others, E. Chiti, ‘The administrative implementations of 
European Union law: a taxonomy and its implications’ in H. Hofmann, A. Türk (eds), Legal Challenges in EU 
Administrative Law Cheltenham (Elgar 2009), 9; J. Ziller, ‘Exécution centralisée et execution partagée: le 
fédéralisme d’exécution en droit de l’Union européenne’ in: J. Dutheil de la Rochère (ed), L’exécution du droit 
de l’Union, entre mécanismes communautaires et droits nationaux Bruylant (Brussels 2009), 111; E. Schmidt-
Aßmann, ‘Introduction: European Composite Administration and the role of European administrative law’, in 
O. Jansen, B. Schöndorf-Haubold (eds), The European Composite Administration (Intersentia 2011) 1; H. 
Hofmann, G. Rowe, A. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union OUP (Oxford 2011); Paul 
Craig, EU Administrative Law (2nd edn), OUP (Oxford 2012). 
25 P. Lindesth, Power and Legitimacy, OUP (Oxford 2010), 254 with reference to A. Menon, S. Weatherill, 
‘Legitimacy, accountability, and delegation in the European Union’ in: A. Arnull, D. Wincott (eds.), Accounta-
bility and legitimacy in the European Union  OUP (Oxford 2002), 119. 
26 These were first developed in the 1960s, and subsequently codified by the Comitology Decisions of 1987, 
1999, and 2006 and the Comitology Regulation of 2011. See: Council Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July 1987 
laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission [1987] OJ 
L197/33 (nlif), Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission [1999] OJ L184/23 amended by Council Decision 
2006/512/EC of 17 July 2006 [2006] OJ 2006 L200/11; Regulation (EC) 182/2011 of 16 February 2011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms 
for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers [2011] OJ L55/13. 
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B. The Specific Procedural Issues Regarding Forms of Act and Action 
 
Administrative implementation of EU law and policies generally results in some form of le-
gally binding or non-binding act. Union bodies can issue acts addressed at individual natural 
and legal persons but equally at Member States and their sub-entities. Such acts can be classi-
fied as to whether they are intended to have a pre-determined amount of addressees in mind or 
whether they are designed to be applicable in a more general manner.  
The former, ‘administrative acts’ can take forms of unilateral decision-making in the typical 
form of a decision (Article 288 TFEU fourth paragraph). Regarding single-case decision-
making, a variable level of detail of procedural regulation different policy-specific and sector-
specific provisions in EU law leads to diverse levels of detail and in some cases protection of 
individuals on matters such as, for example, rights to a hearing or other matters. The differ-
ences are not necessary following a specific logic and the sheer diversity of procedural rules 
can lead to confusions and even, occasionally, contradictions. As a consequence, similar or 
equal problems are regulated in a different manner. The debate is therefore whether a specific 
rule is merited by a given policy area or whether a general, cross-section rule might be able to 
address the issue equally well or better. 
Administrative activity to regulate specific individualized cases can also be issued in forms 
not listed in Article 288 TFEU, for example, as contracts entered into by an EU institution or 
agency on one side and a Member State, agency or private person, on the other. In fact, con-
tracts have become a versatile tool of EU administrative law being used not only for purposes 
of procurement of goods and services and administration of policies such as development aid 
and research.27 Contracts are also used to supplement or complement formal decisions, for 
example in the context of undertakings negotiated with parties to a merger in the area of the 
Commission’s merger control. Finally, contracts have a distinct role as tool in the settlement 
of disputes about obligations arising from EU law.28 Addressing contracts in EU administra-
tive procedure requires taking a stance on which of these forms of act and their specific usag-
es, if not all, should be applicable. Any choice has considerable consequences for the amount 
of detail which needs to be taken into account. Will it be enough to address participation and 
                                                 
27 R. Caranta, G. Edelstam, M. Trybus (eds.) EU Public Contract Law - Public Procurement and Beyond, 
Bruylant (Bruxelles 2013). 
28 H.C.H. Hofmann, Agreements in EU Law, 31 European Law Review (2006) 800. 
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defence rights regarding unilateral decision-making? Or, alternatively, will it be necessary 
also to address the relation between unilateral and negotiated acts such as contracts. The latter 
would imply addressing also the very different approaches which various EU administrative 
legal systems have developed on these matters. 
Executive rule-making through general acts, on the other hand, has many specific problems of 
their own. Next to the more formalised forms of delegated (Article 290 TFEU) and imple-
menting acts (Article 291 TFEU)29 such acts have various kinds of sub-categories the binding 
nature of each cannot always readily be determined.30 This is especially true in cases where 
composite procedures involve EU agencies, such as the European Securities and Markets Au-
thority, directing guidelines at Member State bodies for implementation in national law.31 
Other matters of guidance and planning also remain to be further explored for their legal value 
and the rights of parties involved.  
Finally, regarding composite procedures, often no judicially formal act will result from them. 
But the ongoing procedures themselves may nonetheless influence the conditions under which 
rights of individuals can be enjoyed. Examples are acts of mutual assistance or the manage-
ment of common data basis. Where, such as in the context of the Shengen Information Sys-
tem, or the Single Market Database large amount of personally or commercially sensitive data 
are concerned, specific procedural rules are required to address the issues of rights of protec-
tion of data and access to data.32  
 
                                                 
29 T. Christiansen, M. Dobbels, ‘Non-Legislative Rule Making after the Lisbon Treaty: Implementing the New 
System of Comitology and Delegated Acts’, 19 European Law Journal (2013) 42-56; J. Mendes, ‘Delegated 
and Implementing Rule Making: Proceduralisation and Constitutional Design’, 19 European Law Journal 
(2013) 22-41. 
30 L. Senden, Soft Post-Legislative Rulemaking: A Time for more Stringent Control, 19 European Law Journal 
(2013) 57-75. 
31 Regulation (EU) 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a 
European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision 
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC [2010] OJ L331/84 last amended by Directive 
2014/51/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directives 2003/71/EC 
and 2009/138/EC and Regulations (EC) 1060/2009, (EU) 1094/2010 and (EU) 1095/2010 in respect of the 
powers of the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and 
the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) [2014] OJ L153/1. M. 
Busuioc, Rule-Making by the European Financial Supervisory Authorities: Walking a Tight Rope, 19 European 
Law Journal (2013) 111.  
32 See with further discussion: H.C.H. Hofmann, M. Tidghi, Rights and Remedies in Implementation of EU Pol-
icies by Multi-Jurisdictional Networks, 20 European Public Law (2014) 147. 
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C. Constitutionalisation of the EU Regulatory Model? 
 
In the past six decades of European integration through law the transformations of the legal 
landscape in Europe have been fundamental. During this period, the process of European inte-
gration has shaped but also reflected and re-enforced the predominant legal transformations of 
the time,33 including the move towards an increasing focus on ‘regulatory’ law. 34 In the con-
text of European integration, the creation of the ‘European administrative space’35 has con-
tributed to challenging pre-established constitutional doctrines including those of sovereignty 
and territorial reach of public law. The growth in policy making powers, the diversification of 
forms of act and the pluralisation of the executive actors has not always followed a model pre-
defined in the Treaties. Procedures established in the EU for regulatory governance have 
evolved generally ad-hoc responding to the needs of the time and of specific policy areas. Dif-
ficulties therefore arise from the fact that the vast array of actors, forms of acts and applicable 
procedures make it difficult to assess to what extent constitutional values and general princi-
ples of EU constitutional law guide the development of procedural norms for executive action.  
One of today’s challenges therefore consists of restructuring the EU’s system of executive so 
that it finds itself increasingly in compliance with general constitutional values of the EU. 
Such retro-fitting or further evolution of the legal system is not un-common. Administrative 
law both on the national level and in the EU has in the past been ‘characterised by paradigmat-
ic transformations which are initiated by administrative decision-makers in experimental pro-
cesses’ and then formalised as principles or legitimate approaches by court practice and the 
legislator.36 Most Member States of the EU have addressed the dynamics of transformations in 
their legal systems by codification of a basic set of rules on administrative procedure.37 Even 
                                                 
33 See e.g. A. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (2nd edn), Routledge (London 2000), 223. 
34 S. Rose-Ackerman, The Regulatory State, in M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Compara-
tive Constitutional Law OUP (Oxford 2012), 671. 
35 See with further discussion: H.C.H. Hofmann, Mapping the European Administrative Space, 31 West Europe-
an Politics [2008], 662. 
36 K.-H. Ladeur, ‘The Evolution of General Administrative Law and the Emergence of Postmodern Administra-
tive Law’, Osgoode Hall law School Research paper No 16/2011, 6; M. Ruffert (ed.), The Transformation of 
Administrative Law in Europe, La mutation du droit administrative en Europe, Sellier (München 2007).  
37 See with a comparative overview e.g. J. Ziller, Is a law of administrative procedure for the Union institutions 
necessary? Introductory remarks and prospects, European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Poli-
cies, PE 432.771 (2011), 18. 
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countries like France which so far did not adopt such general rules are moving towards a gen-
eral law on administrative procedure for relations between the individual and the state.38  
However, if amongst the most challenging design-tasks for any rules of EU administrative 
procedure law is ensuring compliance with constitutional principles of the EU in the context 
of a de-central implementation of EU law, this task has not been made easier by that fact that 
in the past, the EU Treaties did not contain an explicit legal basis for establishing a single 
piece of procedural legislation. It was in absence of a core set of administrative procedure 
rules, that each policy area developed its own specific set of rules and principles and the EU 
Courts tried to enforce certain minimum standards by the development of constitutional-level 
general principles of EU law.39 The approach to use general principles of EU law as an ‘Er-
satz’-set of procedural standards which an administrative procedure act could offer, has as 
disadvantage that the general principles are necessarily vague and require to be filled on a 
case-by-case basis with specific meaning. This is – in a way – a parallel situation to the pro-
tection of fundamental rights in the EU pre entry into binding force of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the EU. Although the ‘security valve’ of Article 6(3) TEU ensures that the 
Charter is no final enumeration of fundamental rights in the EU which can choke off further 
developments, the Charter does add to legal clarity and certainty by offering an accessible and 
readable enumeration applicable throughout policy areas. An administrative procedure act for 
the EU could aim at achieving the same objectives – albeit in an area more directly applicable 
in daily affairs of implementation of Union law. The aim such administrative procedure would 
thus be to ensure procedural justice as means of ‘translating’ into daily decision-making im-
portant constitutional value choices.40 In that sense, the law of administrative procedures 
should act as a concretisation of constitutional law.41 This is also the approach taken by the 
                                                 
38 French « loi n°2013-1005 du 12 novembre 2013 habilitant le Gouvernement à simplifier les relations entre 
l’administration et les citoyens ». For discussions of earlier attempts to legislate in this field in France, see e.g. 
Y. Gaudemet, La codification de la procédure administrative non contentieuse en France, Recueil Dalloz Sirey 
(1986) 107; P. Gonod, la codification de la procédure administrative, AJDA (2006) 489. 
 
39 These general principles resulted from a comparative analysis of Member State law (See e.g. the approach in 
Joined Cases 7/56 & 3-7/57 Alegera and others v Common Assembly [1957/58] ECR English Special Edition 
39) and policy-specific norms of EU law - as prominently demonstrated by J. Schwarze, European Administra-
tive Law, (translation from the original: J. Schwarze, Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht Nomos (Baden-Baden, 
1988). Such deductive method is not uncommon as studies in ‘Global Administrative Law’ illustrate. See e.g. 
G. della Cananea, A. Sandulli (eds.), Global Standards for Public Authorities, Editoriale Scientifica (Napoli 
2012); G. Anthony, J.-B. Auby, J. Morrison, T. Zwart (eds.) Values in Global Administrative Law, Hart (Ox-
ford 2011). 
40 D. Curtin, H.C.H. Hofmann, J. Mendes, ‘Constitutionalising EU Executive Rule-Making Procedures: A Re-
search Agenda’, 19 European Law Journal (2013), 1. 
41 This formulation of the problem goes back to an article in German by: F. Werner, ‘Verwaltungsrecht als Kon-
kretisiertes Verfassungsrecht‘, (1959) Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt, 527. 
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EP´s resolution of 15 January 2013, in which the EP has called upon the European Commis-
sion to develop a proposal for a regulation on EU administrative procedure based on constitu-
tional principles.42 
 
D. An EU Regulation of Administrative Procedures? 
 
The discussions outlined above show that the debate on the necessity of an EU administrative 
procedure act has accordingly already some history.43 It addresses three basic problems. One is 
the question of applicability of a general set of rules on administrative procedure in view of 
policy-specific rules. A second is the question of the scope of applicability of EU administra-
tive procedure rules in cases of Member State implementing activity. A third relates to the 
degree in which EU administrative procedure rules should address specific forms of act. 
 
I. EU administrative procedure rules as lex generalis? 
 
Some of the most important and – maybe also most discussed – aspects of drafting a possible 
EU administrative procedure act would refer to the scope of applicability of general rules on 
EU administrative procedure.  
One scenario could consist of establishing rules on administrative procedure which contain 
only minimum standards for all administrative activity but being the basic level of protection 
applicable across all policy areas. It would leave the option of defining a higher level of pro-
tection to policy-specific rules. In that scenario, in absence of any policy specific rules, the 
general principles would be applicable. This approach allows to ensure that a certain flexibil-
                                                 
42  European Parliament Resolution of 15 January 2013 with recommendations to the Commission on a Law of 
Administrative Procedure of the European Union (2012/2024(INI)); see also the Council of Europe Recom-
mendation CM/Rec(2007)7 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on good administration. 
43 See with further references e.g. C.Harlow, Codification of EC Administrative Procedures, Fitting the Shoe to 
the Foot or the Foot to the Shoe, 2 European Law Journal (1996) 3; S. Kadelbach, ‘European Administrative 
Law and the Law of a Europeanised Administration’, in: C.Joerges, R.Dehousse (eds.) Good Governance in 
Europe’s Integrated Market, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2002), 167; C. Ladenburger, ‘Evolution oder 
Kodifikation eines allgemeinen Verwaltungsrechts in der EU’, in: H.-H. Trute, T. Groß, H. Röhl, C. Möllers, 
(eds.), Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht - zur Tragfähigkeit eines Konzepts, Mohr Siebeck (Tübingen: 2008), 107; 
O. Mir Puigpelat, ‘La codificación del procedimiento administrativo en la union administrativa europea’, in: F. 
Velasco Caballero, J.-P. Schneider (eds.), La unión administrativa europea, Marcial Pons (Madrid, 2008), 51 
(with German translation published as ‚Die Kodifikation des Verwaltungsverfahrensrechts im Europäischen 
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ity for newly developing areas is given whilst at the same time requiring that exceptions are 
made explicit and subject to full and public scrutiny of any possible justification.  
An alternative approach, however, might be more successful in overall increasing the level of 
protection of basic constitutional principles. It would provide for a general act with high levels 
of protection to which policy-specific law could, in justified cases, create exceptions both 
providing for higher as well as lower levels of protection. This approach would allow for a 
base-line of more than minimum level protection and – by means of requirement of justifica-
tion – put the onus of reasoning on any norm suggesting lower than standard protection.  
 
II. Scope of Application of EU Administrative Procedure Law in Case of Mem-
ber State Implementation? 
 
Similarly, the relation of EU administrative procedure law and that of the Member States is a 
contentious issue. Whether Member States should apply EU procedural rules when imple-
menting EU law at all, or only when acting in specific contexts such as participation in EU 
information systems and conducting mutual assistance operations, has been subject to many 
debates. To a certain degree they are reminiscent of the dispute surrounding the interpretation 
of Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the Akerberg Fransson 
case of the CJEU.44 One possibility is to argue in favour of an approach parallel to the defini-
tion of the institutional scope of applicability of Article 41 CFR which includes institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies of the Union only and excludes the Member States. Although 
such limited scope has disadvantages for the protection of individuals, it would allow the de-
velopment of an EU law on administrative procedures by means of a step-by-step approach in 
which a test phase of applying rules to EU institutions might be expanded later also to Mem-
ber States when implementing EU law. The great disadvantage of such approach is that it will 
be problematic for composite procedures since one procedure will be subject to the laws of 
different jurisdictions. Any form of information cooperation but probably also most areas of 
mutual assistance will therefore have to be addressed from a purely EU law based approach in 
order to grant effective protection. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Verwaltungsverbund‘, Die Verwaltung (2009) Beiheft 8, 177-210); M. Shapiro, ‘Codification of Administrative 
Law: The US and the Union’, 2 European Law Journal (1996) 26. 
44 Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson [2013]. 
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III. Procedural Rules for Different Forms of Act? 
 
Next to discussions on the overall scope of a possible general set of rules for EU administra-
tive law, debates on potential rules on specific forms of act of the EU each have their specific-
ities in the debate. For example, there has been much debate about executive rule-making pro-
cedures including the role of impact assessment procedures therein.45 But also the scope of 
applicability of the rules on rule-making raise questions as to whether to treat all externally 
binding and not directly externally binding rules to the same set of procedural rigour of a for-
malised rule-making procedure. Since distinctions can be slightly blurry, especially in cases 
where in practice informal rules are used to replace formal rule-making, arguably, the funda-
mental procedural principles of transparency and participation should also be complied with. 
But it would, on the other hand, also make sense to develop EU legislation in the field of ad-
ministrative procedures in a step-by-step approach testing first the workings of a more formal-
ised rule-making procedure on externally binding acts before rolling out such procedures also 
to formerly non-binding types of act.  
Matters of EU public contract law have proven to be complex not least because of the great 
versatility of this form of act. With regard to public contracts, basic questions which need to 
be addressed include whether public contract law should be specific for public procurement.46 
Might the same model of public contracts and procedural rules applicable to them also be used 
for all other types of contracts? Should, then, the conclusion and execution of contracts con-
cluded by public authorities implementing EU law for matters such as settlement of conflicts 
follow the same procedural rules? And, what are the basic EU principles linked to contracts? 
How far are they different from unilateral decision-making? Should there even be a specific 
regime for public contracts as opposed to contracts under private law? And how to ensure that 
by choosing the mode of contractual approach, a public authority could not only circumvent 
procedural guarantees provided for by law for unilateral decision-making, but also substantive 
legal provisions? 
                                                 
45 A. Alemanno, A. Meuwese, Impact Assessment of EU Non-Legislative Rulemaking: The Missing Link in 
‘New Comitology’, 19 European Law Journal (2013) 76. 
46 R. Noguellou, U. Stelkens (eds.), Comparative Law on Public Contracts: Comparative analysis of the public 
contract law of 28 states Bruylant (Brussels 2010). 
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Further issues concern information management procedures whose good functioning are es-
sential pre-conditions for the realisation of the right to good administration.47 In requiring fair 
and impartial decision making, good administration depends on procedures which allow ad-
ministrations taking into account and reasoning about the relevant facts of a case including 
those which arise from other jurisdictions within the EU. The question is not only whether 
such matters can be made capable of being addressed in a cross-section manner as an essential 
part of a possible future EU administrative procedure code. The question is also how to ensure 
that effective judicial review will be possible of any act which results from such information 
sharing arrangement. One approach would consist of clarification of applicable law to infor-
mation cooperation and identifying clearly responsibilities including responsible courts. In 
absence of such basic requirements, increasing administrative cooperation and integration 
would otherwise result in decreasing possibilities of holding administrations to account.  
 
E. Where To From Here? 
 
Any future EU legislation on administrative procedure requires a legal basis in the Treaty. 
Whilst initially, much consideration was based on possibilities or limits of Article 114 TFEU, 
with entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 298 TFEU now opens different options 
for adopting Union legislation to support the administrative organisation and procedural rules. 
The reference in the first paragraph of Article 298 TFEU to a ‘European administration’ as 
explicitly opposed to the otherwise mentioned ‘institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the 
Union’ arguably not only allows for the adoption of measures addressed at Union bodies, but 
also contains a legal basis for provisions on information management and mutual assistance 
                                                 
47 D.-U. Galetta, H.C.H. Hofmann, J.-P. Schneider, Information Exchange in the European Administrative Un-
ion: An Introduction, 20 European Public Law (2014) 65-69; D.-U. Galetta, Informal Information Processing in 
Dispute Resolution Networks: Informality versus the Protection of Individual’s Rights?, 20 European Public 
Law (2014) 88; H.C.H. Hofmann, M. Tidghi, Rights and Remedies in Implementation of EU Policies by Multi-
Jurisdictional Networks, 20 European Public Law (2014) 147; J.-P. Schneider, European Information Systems 
and Data Protection as Elements of the European Administrative Union, in: D. Dörr, R. Weaver (eds.), The 
Right to Privacy in the Light of Media Convergence –Perspectives from Three Continents, Walter de Gruyter 
(Berlin/Boston 2012) 374; J.-P. Schneider, ‘Informationssysteme als Bausteine des Europäischen Verwaltung-
sverbunds’, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (2012) 65 
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which Member States administrations undertake in implementation of EU law.48 But whether 
such far reaching approach could be currently opportune is another matter. The EP has called 
for the Commission to draft a legislative proposal on administrative procedures. One may 
hope that these attempts will lead to an outcome fully exploring the dimensions of the prob-
lem and not remaining on the surface. A network of EU and administrative law professors and 
practitioners, the Research Network on EU Administrative Law (ReNEUAL), has developed 
in preparation of the legislative procedure set of ‘Model Rules of EU Administrative Proce-
dure’.49 These Model Rules attempt to present in a clear and accessible manner solutions to 
the legal questions discussed throughout this chapter and could be used as benchmark against 
which to review any legislative proposals from the Commission.  
                                                 
48 P. Craig, ‘A General Law on Administrative Procedure, Legislative Competence and Judicial Competence’, 
19 European Public Law (2013), 503. 
49 The Model Rules are available with explanations and introductions in full text in English language at 
www.reneual.eu. French, Spanish, Italian, German and Polish translations are in preparation and will be pub-
lished when available. The author of this chapter is one of the founders and coordinators of ReNEUAL. 
